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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________  
 
No. 12-4562 
___________ 
 
NINA SHAHIN, 
                                  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE OF DELAWARE 
____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the  District of Delaware 
 (D.C. Civil No. 12-cv-01080) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Sue L. Robinson 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted on a Motion for Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
August 15, 2013 
 Before:  HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR. and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed:  September 4, 2013) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Nina Shahin appeals from orders1
                                                 
1 Shahin mentions only the latter order in her notice of appeal, but we liberally construe 
her notice to include the earlier order. 
 of the United States District Court for the 
District of Delaware, which denied her application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), 
2 
 
and her motion for reargument.  Because we agree that no substantial question is raised 
by the appeal, we will grant the Appellee’s motion for summary affirmance. 
 The sole issue in this appeal is whether the District Court abused its discretion in 
denying Shahin’s application to proceed IFP.  See United States v. Holiday, 436 F.2d 
1079, 1079-80 (3d Cir. 1971) (granting of application to proceed IFP is committed to 
sound discretion of district court).  In determining whether a litigant is eligible for IFP 
status, the Court should consider the financial position of the party.  A party need not be 
destitute to warrant such status, Adkins v. E.I. Dupont Nemours Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 
(1948), but the status is a privilege rather than a right, White v. Colo., 157 F.3d 1226, 
1233 (10th Cir. 1998).  Shahin argues that the District Court abused its discretion by 
requiring her to disclose her spouse’s assets (or otherwise considering what those assets 
might be), and by considering assets held in trust.  We disagree. 
 The Court required Shahin to fill out a form disclosing her income, expenses, and 
assets, as well as those of her spouse.  Shahin indicated that she has a monthly income of 
$95 from self-employment, and that her home and vehicle are held in a “grantor’s trust 
and kids are the owners.”  Shahin did not disclose any of her husband’s income or assets, 
but included a notarized statement signed by her husband, indicating that he is unwilling 
to disclose his finances and that he does not support his wife’s “personal lawsuits . . . in 
any way, shape or form.”  The statement indicated, however, that he provides Shahin 
“with food, clothing, shelter, paying her medical and travel expenses and even her 
business losses.”   
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   Shahin has argued that the value of her car and the house in which she resides 
should not be considered because they are held in trust.  However, she produced the trust 
agreement in the District Court, and it is a revocable trust.  She and her husband are the 
grantors, and the trust agreement provides that “the trustees may pay income of the trust 
estate and such portion of the principal as the grantors from time [sic] may direct to the 
grantors, or otherwise as they direct during their lives.”  Although the couple’s children 
are co-trustees and may have to agree to any such distribution, because the trust is 
revocable, it is not unreasonable to consider the trust property in determining whether 
Shahin is eligible to proceed IFP.  Cf. Kelley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 566 F.3d 347, 350 
(3d Cir. 2009) (Social Security Act treats corpus of revocable trust as resource available 
to individual).  Further, even without considering the trust property, Shahin indicates that 
she has a monthly income of $95 from self-employment.  Because her husband provides 
her “with food, clothing, shelter, paying her medical and travel expenses and even her 
business losses,” requiring Shahin to pay her own litigation expenses, although requiring 
her to save for several months, would not deprive her of the “necessities of life.”  Adkins, 
335 U.S. at 339.     
 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Shahin the privilege of proceeding IFP; thus, we will affirm the 
decisions of the District Court. 
